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“PMFs are increasingly being employed with United States taxpayer dollars to perform security-related 
functions in Iraq…Disturbingly, while some reports estimate that PMFs currently employ as many as 
20,000 people for their operations in Iraq, these companies remain largely unregulated.”1
“…500 years after the demarcation between mercenary and standing armies, 700 years after the formation 
of the free companies, and 2300 years after Alexander employed mercenary Cretan archers, the 
international community again wrestles with the question of how to regulate mercenaries.”2
I. INTRODUCTION
A century ago, sociologist Max Weber, identified the State as that entity which 
“successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in 
the enforcement of its order.”3 Two general reasons accounted for Weber’s assertion. 
Firstly, the rise and maturity of the modern nation-state and its nationalistic credo of 
patriotic armed forces as a symbol of national security and governmental authority in 
defending its territory and citizenry. Secondly, the nature of military skill and its 
underpinnings—the management and deployment of violence. “The predominant 
cultural view, reflected in legal and ideological prohibitions, is that military skill should 
not be bought and sold, that it should not be conceived of or treated as a commodity. It 
is viewed as ‘non-commodifiable.’”4
Interestingly though the reality past and present is that “[as] long as humanity has 
waged war, there have been mercenaries.”5 In essence the monopolization of force by 
the State has never been absolute. States have not been averse to incorporating or
*
 LL.B (Hons) (Moi), LL.M (Hons) (Cantab), PhD (Melb), Lecturer, School of Law, University of 
Newcastle.
**
 B.Th.(Eastern P.B.C.), M. A. (Dist.) (Wilfrid Laurier), M.A. (McMaster), LL.B. (Windsor), LL.M. 
(Dist.) (Qld), Lecturer, School of Law, University of Newcastle.
1
‘Dodd Requests GAO Report on Private Military Firms in Iraq’, April 29, 2004, available online at 
http://dodd.senate.gov/press/Releases/04/0429.htm (visited Oct 12. 2004).
2
 Todd S. Milliard, ‘Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call To Recognize And Regulate Private 
Military Companies’, 176 Military Law Review 1, 11 (2003). As Todd S Milliard notes:
National armies with professional soldiers allegiant to their nation-state represent a surprisingly 
new phenomenon. Prior to the French Revolution, no dishonour followed the man who fought 
under a flag not his own. Instead, leaders often turned to private soldiers during times of 
military necessity, and these men were equally willing to soldier for pay on someone else’s 
behalf.
Ibid. at 26.
3 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization 154 (A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons 
trans., 1947).
4
 Montgomery Sapone, ‘Have Rifle with Scope, Will Travel: The Global Economy of Mercenary 
Violence’, 30 Cal. W. Int’l L.J 1, 5 (1999). 
5
 Juan Carlos Zarate, ‘The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, 
International Law, and the New World Disorder’, 34 Stanford Journal of International Law 75 (1998).
2capturing the “violence of privateers—a form of violence external to the State—and 
selectively sanctioning it when profitable or expedient.6 In past centuries, States relied 
on private organizations with their own military power to undertake foreign ventures. 
These included founding colonies, which States themselves lacked the revenue to 
finance or to assist States pursues hegemonic ambitions. The State’s monopolization of 
force is a rather recent phenomenon. Despite the State’s right to hold a monopoly on the 
use of force, there is nothing natural about this arrangement. “Until the mid-nineteenth 
century, military knowledge and labour were an alienable commodity in an international 
market. Sovereignty bore little or no relation to the control of organized violence.”7
As European States bureaucratically matured in the nineteenth century, their capability 
to organize violence increased tremendously.8 States began to hire soldiers and sailors 
from all regions to serve in their respective armed forces as well as to have recourse to 
mercenaries.9 With the consolidation of central authority in most European States in the 
nineteenth century and the establishment of the notion of nation-state sovereignty, the 
recruitment of foreigners for duty in national armies declined. Beginning in the 
nineteenth century, States aggressively sought to control military violence through 
centralization and monopolization resulting in hierarchical structures that marginalized 
mercenaries. “The result was that the utility of the private military corporation as a tool 
of state warfare disappeared.”10
In the twentieth century the mercenary vilified and outlawed. This was primarily owing 
to a new kind of soldier of fortune—the independent mercenaries, commonly referred to 
as “wild geese,” or les affreux (“the dreaded ones”).11 They plied their trade 
predominantly in post-colonial Africa, into prominence during the turbulence of 
decolonization and its aftermath in Africa, where they complicated already difficult 
situations. They presented significant threats to many fledgling newly independent 
African States. As Juan Carlos Zarate, an assistant US secretary of the Treasury notes: 
“these independent mercenaries, hired outside the constraints of the twentieth century 
nation-state system and seemingly motivated solely by pecuniary interests, were seen as 
a shocking anachronism.”12
The soldiers of fortune who infested Africa in the 1960s and 1970s were generally 
individual adventurers without corporate backing, who sought excitement as well as 
money in troubled corners of the earth.13 This new breed of soldier of fortune was 
vilified despite previous acceptance of the commodification of mercenary violence. This 
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3new breed was seen as illegitimate when contrasted with “appropriate” State violence.14
The new breed of mercenary was an abhorrent participant in the international military
marketplace since the State had moved away from a commodification of violence. They 
consisted of motley collections of self-seekers operating outside the State system. Like 
their predecessors, the nature of the soldier-for-hire was the same; they appeared where 
there had been a breakdown of internal order as a source of instant military force and 
expertise.15
In contradistinction to the traditional soldier of fortune contemporary Private Military 
Firms (PMFs) do not fit the “conventional image of private security services as being 
sold mainly by gang leaders, mafias, or war lords and by (foreign) individuals or 
mercenaries”.16 PMFs however range from well-established firms with thousands of 
years of collective experience in war zones, to start-ups that did not exist before the end 
of the Cold War but mushroomed as a result of the vacuums created by states 
downsizing their militaries.17 Although in form resembling their antecedents, PMFs 
have developed a modus operandi compatible with the needs and strictures of the post-
Cold War, State-based international system leading to both implicit and explicit 
legitimacy. Firstly, they are serious players, recognized within international business 
circles and markets. Secondly, their legitimacy is bolstered by strong personal and 
professional links to the governments and militaries of their respective home States.18
Clearly, the issues raised by the ascendance of contemporary PMFs would be suitable 
for a book length treatment; however, in light of the pressing nature of the present 
situation expediency dictates a shorter but timelier piece. This article has as its modest 
aim an exploration of the thorny legal issues raised by the commodification of force. It 
discusses the nature of the contemporary PMF noting that it bears vestiges of yester year 
mercenaries. It then grapples with their uncertain status under international law despite 
the fact that they potentially pose problems for state authority and the direct control of 
states over the use of force. At the heart of the argument is the reality that PMFs
maintain the ability to inflict violence on a scale previously reserved to sovereign 
nations and the real potential to violate humanitarian norms. Yet, they are largely 
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4inadequately regulated under existing domestic and international frameworks thus bear
hazy legal liability and sanction.
II. TROUBLE IS THEIR BUSINESS: CONTEMPORARY PRIVATE 
MILITARY FIRMS
Some of the most striking images from the invasion of Iraq in 2003 widely circulated in 
the Western media were of charred torsos suspended by a cable from a suspension 
bridge in the March 2004 attack in Fallujah.19 The photos show a flaming SUV, a small 
but elated crowd and various Iraqis (presumably) in the process of striking the torsos.  
One of the photos shows a torso completely charred, with the lower legs cut off, the 
arms cut off and being attacked by men with sticks.20  It is not an attractive sight. 
It was immediately reported that the torso and bodies were actually four employees of a 
USA private military contractor.21 The dead were employees of Blackwater Security 
Consulting, of Moyock, North Carolina.  Allegedly, the contractor was providing 
security for a food convoy. It is not clear to whom the food was being delivered, or why 
it was necessary to have a two part security detail, nor yet why a private company with 
unmarked vehicles was providing the security, rather than perhaps the US forces.  
Blackwater has as its company motto, next to a photo of a face in obscured military 
goggles and a group of five grey suited, helmeted snipers with assault rifles poised from 
their shoulders “In support of Freedom and Democracy Everywhere” posted on its 
company website.22
The incident above is but a tip of the iceberg of a wider range of incidents around the 
globe23 that raise a host of complex legal issues. These issues range from the legitimacy 
of economic motives in war, to potential culpability of contractor’s employees for war 
crimes in an international forum, to the proper purpose of corporations and directors’ 
liabilities and to the constitutionality of the use of force by non-government actors. This 
is in light of the fact that rights and duties that exist between the military and its 
contractors constitute an uncertain, legal grey zone. The fundamental problem is that 
command and control so essential for military operations in a theatre of conflict is 
muddled and unclear with regard to private military personnel. As the debacle unfolding 
in Iraq demonstrates, often, local military commanders are unaware of the daily actions 
of firms in their zones of responsibility. As one former Special Forces veteran said of 
the role of PMFs in Iraq: “The military really can’t tell you [the PMFs] how to do your 
19
 Information accessed online at http://www.thememoryhole.org/war/fallujah_31mar04/ (visited Oct. 20, 
2004).
20
 A video of some parts of the event show the vehicle to have been a white SUV with no military 
markings.  http://www.thememoryhole.org/war/fallujah_31mar04/fallujah_31mar04_uncut.wmv (visited 
Oct. 2, 2004).
21 Sewell Chan “U.S. Civilians Mutilated in Iraq Attack: 4 Die in Ambush; 5 Soldiers Killed By 
Roadside Blast”, Washington Post Foreign Service, April 1, 2004; Page A01.
22
 Blackwater Consulting, information available on its official website  http://blackwaterusa.com/ (visited 
Sep 30, 2004)
23
 See e.g. David Kassebaum, ‘A Question of Facts—The Legal Use of Private Security Firms in Bosnia’, 
38 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 581 (2000); Juan Carlos Zarate, ‘The Emergence of a New 
Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World Disorder’, 
34 Stanford Journal of International Law 75 (1998).
5job—they can advise you, but they really have no control over you.”24 This ambiguity 
and consequent problems have been identified by military jurists themselves. They note 
that;
… by ignoring the well-thought-out doctrine on civilians’ role in warfare, contractors now 
operate in a legal no man’s land, beyond established boundaries of military or international 
law. The reality of the fact is that since contractors do not fall under within the formal military 
hierarchy, they are generally self-policing entities.25
Not surprising then that a great deal of genuine alarm has been generated by the lack of 
oversight of PMFs and their ever-increasing role in the prosecution of war.  As Iraq 
demonstrates, there are numerous issues pertaining to the operations of, contracting 
with, and rules governing the operation of PMFs. This is more so since their largely 
unregulated activities span a number of fields ranging from police, paramilitary, and 
military training to logistics and protection of installations and officials. In sum, 
mercenary soldiers now often act as “trainers” and “advisors” to armies that have 
contracted for their martial services, bid for overseas military assistance contracts with 
the knowledge of their respective governments, and occasionally execute the foreign 
policy aims of their governments.26
The emergence of private military firms (PMFs) and their formidable financial and 
military capabilities does not fit into the paradigm of the State as an entity bearing 
monopoly over military force. Commenting on the decentralization of state control over 
the use of force, William W. Keller notes: “This change in military relationship between 
States and private entities suggests that some States no longer exert explicit control over 
military technology or manpower. Military skill is becoming increasingly privatized and 
commodified.”27 The dangers of the privatization of force and concerns regarding the 
dangers of excessive and arbitrary uses of force have finally materialized at a large and 
well-publicized scale in the Iraq war where PMFs are heavily engaged in a wide range 
of operations from transport of supplies to interrogation of prisoners. The central claim 
that private punishment, policing, and military corporations violate human rights more 
often than public punishment, policing, and military institutions28 is finding practical 
manifestation in the various scandals that engulf the military operation in Iraq. This is 
symptomatic of earlier controversies elsewhere involving PMFs.29
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6Concerns about PMFs “like concern about mercenaries, pirates, and terrorists, stems 
from the inherent violence of their profession combined with a lack of control over and 
accountability for their actions.”30 Matters are not helped by the fact that governments 
use of PMFs is rarely transparent and in most cases is deliberately opaque, deniable and 
veiled from public and parliamentary view. Like the soldiers of fortune of yester years, 
the basis of PMF operations calls into question their legality.31 Firstly, to the extent that 
such law can be identified, it provides little guidance regarding the services PMFs 
provide, whether training or actual combat.32 Secondly, despite a multitude of 
declarations and resolutions by the UN and several anti-mercenary conventions, State 
practice does not give rise to an absolute international norm banning the use of 
mercenaries. Lastly, States have been lax in promulgating and enforcing municipal laws 
that restrict their citizens’ ability to serve as mercenaries. Indeed in a grant of limited 
legitimacy States have not been averse to hiring mercenaries or to contracting foreigners 
to achieve their political and military needs. As Professor Howe, a leading Cambridge 
scholar notes:
Private companies offer many significant military advantages. A private force can start up and 
deploy faster than multinational, and perhaps national, forces. Additionally, it probably will 
have a clearer chain of command and is not subject to the changing political desires or fears of 
the contributing nations. It will not suffer the national vs. supra-national tensions that plague 
multinational forces. It may have more readily compatible military equipment training and 
common language, and possibly greater experience of working together than do ad hoc 
multinational forces.33
PMFs may be seen in many ways as a recycled form of past mercenary organizations. 
However unlike past mercenary organizations, they present a disturbing and frightening 
phenomenon in view of their immense financial, military and political clout.34 The 
activities of PMFs, the “clients” they serve and their global insider connections provide 
an alarming look into the realpolitik of the emerging new world order. A 2002 UK 
government report35 on PMFs noted that most services they provide fall within the areas 
of military advice,36 training37 and logistic support.38 The report further notes that PMF 
services encompass vital military functions and caution that some likely fall within the 
ambit of combat operations owing to the fact that “[t]he distinction between combat and 
non-combat operations is often artificial.”39
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7The rapid privatization of force and commodification of violence is readily apparent in 
Iraq where PMFs account for a large share of the military personnel. This is partly to fill 
the gap in personnel generated by the Bush administration’s failure to enlist serious 
assistance from the United Nations or its NATO allies. There are presently 15,000 
private personnel carrying out mission-critical military roles.40 Indeed, there are more 
private military contractors on the ground in Iraq than troops from any one American 
ally, including Britain (a major partner in the military misadventure). This leads Peter 
W Singer, a leading scholar and analyst of PMFs to observe that it is more a “coalition 
of the billing” than of the “willing.”41
Observers believe that the dramatic growth in private security challenges the 
international State system’s three hundred year control over military might. PMFs now 
stand in a position to eventually threaten global order with military force that is less 
accountable and controllable than state militaries.42  There is little doubt that the 
privatization of force affects the role of the State in the regulation of violence and hence 
one of the basic features of statehood. The failure to have direct regulation of violence 
means that the State’s monopoly over military force is fragmented. In turn the 
foundations of its authority are of necessity shaken as established private firms 
increasingly shoulder military responsibilities that once belonged to the state. The multi-
billion dollar question then is whether this new trend and growth in global security falls 
within the ambit of national and international law, and if so whether adequate regulatory 
and accountability mechanisms exist.
II. PMFs UNDER NATIONAL LAW: UNLOVED, BUT IN WITH A CHANCE
The close relationship between private military companies and Western governments 
and their use as agents of, or substitutes for, foreign policy is a matter of concern. Often, 
PMFs are a primary vehicle through which states utilize the covert violence of private 
actors to pursue foreign policy objectives. While PMFs are companies and therefore 
apparently private entities, disconnected from the state, they have become a type of 
State agent—tied to their home State by tacit or licensed approval for their activities and 
enlisted as contractors for the employing country. 
Zarate notes that State responsibility for the actions of PMFs seems to flow in two 
directions: responsibility toward the home State which tolerates and “exports” these 
companies’ services, and responsibility toward the contracting State which enlists and 
directs the activities of the PMF.43 The authors of this article concur with this position in 
light of the fact that there are sufficient connections between PMFs and states to trigger 
state responsibility allowing liability to flow both to the home and contracting states. 
These include personnel connections, their use for foreign policy operations, their close 
participation in military operations, personal and professional relationships between 
40
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8PMF executives and various governmental officials as well as state-managed systems of 
oversight, licensing and control. 
Governments appear to think of PMFs in terms, not of suppression, but of regulation. 
Thus for example UK Baroness Symons, Minister of State in charge of among other 
responsibilities International Security told the House of Lords in 1998 that the UK 
government was examining a number of options for national domestic regulation of 
PMFs operating out of the United Kingdom.44 The UK position is readily apparent in 
various initiatives by Western governments in which the bulk of the PMFs are 
incorporated. One cannot help but notice that in the few countries where legislation or 
guidelines have been passed in relation to PMFs, they do not seek to make such 
enterprises illegal, rather they impose conditions relating to specific approval from 
designated government bodies before any operation is embarked upon. 
Some governments have not be averse to the hiring of PMFs to work for legitimate 
foreign governments and the use services of such companies as a bargaining chip in 
negotiations with these governments.45 Zarate notes that the attractiveness of PMFs as a 
foreign policy instrument has to do with the reality that since “these are private 
companies, countries which recommend or export them arguably can disavow any 
connection to SCs’[Security Companies referred to as PMFs in this article] activities. 
Potentially, this allows exporting governments to use SCs as political pawns to affect 
the internal affairs of a country or region while retaining their official neutrality in such 
conflicts.”46 Propounding this observation further, Zarate captures the expedience of this 
arrangement thus:
The contracting country can use and dispose of these services readily without concern for the 
company’s political ambitions or for political favours which may need to be repaid. This “clean 
hands” approach to foreign policy appears dangerous to those who see transparent nation-state 
accountability as essential to controlling human rights violations and the type and quality of 
military activity throughout the world.47
The validity of Zarate’s observation is readily apparent when one considers the report of 
the Legg inquiry, set up by the Foreign Secretary in response to parliamentary and 
public criticism over the role of the British Foreign Office in sanctioning the 
intervention of a PMF in Sierra Leone in the publicized and sensational arms-to-Africa 
saga.48 The Legg Report mildly rebuked Peter Penfold, the British ambassador to the 
country whose complicity in a deal sanctioning a PMF to intervene in Sierra Leone was 
beyond dispute. The report noted in a nonchalant manner that he ought to have been 
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9“sufficiently conscious of political and public unease about mercenaries”.49 It went on 
to clear other officials by describing their role/activities in ambiguous non-critical 
language.50 In addition, the Legg Report treated “private military companies” simply as 
commercial organizations which “are entitled to carry on their business within the law 
and, for that purpose, to have the access and support which Departments are there to 
provide British citizens and companies.”51
The Legg Report contained rebukes but of a mild nature couched in feeble diplomatic 
language. This was not unintentional, the reality is that: “Even as governments debate 
how to hold [PMFs] accountable, these hired guns are rapidly becoming indispensable 
to national militaries, private corporations, and nongovernmental groups across the 
globe.”52 In a statement that mirrors the utility of PMFs, Professor Debra Avant a 
political science and international affairs expert at the George Washington University
notes that:
The use of contractors to avoid governmental accountability is…worrisome. In the United 
States, for instance, the executive branch hires contractors. Although the U.S. Congress 
approves the military budget, its access to information about contracts is often limited. The 
president can use this advantage to evade restrictions on U.S. actions, effectively limiting 
congressional checks on foreign policy.53
Thus PMFs are often used as a low-cost foreign policy tool. This allows governments 
(especially in the West) to implement controversial or unsavoury aspects of their 
sovereign policy which are best kept at arms’ length.54 These firms’ low profile has the 
distinct advantage of helping avoid unwelcome publicity when things go wrong in 
covert and semi-covert operations around the world.55 As Professor Avant poignantly 
notes:
By calling on firms that have entire fleets of giant Russian cargo planes and hundreds of 
soldiers of fortune ready to parachute anywhere, leaders in Washington and other Western 
capitals now have the freedom to intervene abroad and pay little domestic political price.56
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The ambiguity with which governments treat PMFs obscures their questionable 
legitimacy. This ambiguity allows PMFs to lay claim to being public benefactors, 
serving only recognized governments, bringing peace and order where there is anarchy 
and violence thus creating the basic conditions for development. For example, one 
leading PMF, Blackwater Security Consulting notes on its website that it’s provides a 
new generation of capability, skills, and people to solve the spectrum of needs in the 
world of security.57 Yet another, CACI International—at the centre of the prisoner abuse 
scandal at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq—notes that its solutions lead the transformation of 
defence and intelligence, assure homeland security, enhance decision-making and help 
government to work smarter, faster and more responsively.58
In sum, within the national arena, while states are wary of PMFs, they nevertheless 
recognize their utility-explicitly or explicitly. The reluctance of governments to put in 
place adequate domestic safeguards leads us to turn to international law to discover 
whether any proper regulatory regimes exist.  The next part of the article focuses on the 
status of PMFs under international law by undertaking a tour de horizon of relevant 
international instruments. The section seeks to show that “…contrary to common belief, 
a total ban on mercenaries does not exist in international law.59 This in turn means that 
the existing international framework, just like the domestic one, does not adequately 
deal with the full variety of private military actors.60  The part’s analysis will show that 
international law fails to address contemporary PMFs, with relevant provisions proving 
ineffectual in anchoring PMFs within the cradle of mercenarism despite these firms 
having features of mercenarism. 
III. PMFs UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SLIPPERY SLOPE
A. General Assembly Resolutions
The authors wish to commence this section by noting that the initiatives to ban 
mercenaries were not solely driven by the General Assembly, but also by U.N. Security 
Council. Various resolutions by the Council sought to ban the recruitment, use, and 
training of mercenaries aimed at destabilizing national liberation movements.1 However 
in light of the fact that Council resolutions were all highly particularized, prompted by 
specific incidents the article chooses to dwell on Assembly resolutions. Admittedly, 
some of the Assembly’s resolutions bear the same weakness as Council resolutions—
particularization to specific incidents. However, a number of them were of a more 
general nature paving the way for argument that the Assembly’s numerous resolutions 
on the matter as well as its broader constituency, unlike the Security Council evidences 
emerging opinio juris.
57
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58
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General Assembly formal activities in relation to mercenarism date back to 1968. In 
Resolution 2395, condemning Portugal’s failure to grant independence to the territories 
under its domination,61 the Assembly appealed to all States: 
…to take all measures to prevent the recruitment or training in their territories of any persons 
as mercenaries for the colonial war being waged in the Territories under Portuguese 
domination and for violations of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the independent 
African States.62
In the same year, the General Assembly made its first general foray into the regulation 
of mercenary activities in post-colonial regimes through the adoption and passage of 
Resolution 2465—the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples.63 In paragraph 8 of the resolution, the Assembly declared that: 
The practice of using mercenaries against movements for national liberation and independence 
is punishable as a criminal act and that the mercenaries themselves are outlaws, and calls upon 
the Governments of all countries to enact legislation declaring the recruitment, financing and 
training of mercenaries in their territory to be a punishable offence and prohibiting their 
nationals from serving as mercenaries.64
Subsequently, the General Assembly reiterated its position on the question of 
mercenaries in Resolution 2548.65 In the resolution the General Assembly reaffirmed 
that: “the practice of using mercenaries against national liberation movements and 
sovereign States constitutes a criminal act and that the mercenaries themselves are 
criminals.”66 The resolution went on to exhort Governments of all countries to enact 
legislation that would declare “the recruitment, financing and training of mercenaries in 
their territories, and the transit of mercenaries through their territories, to be punishable 
offences, and prohibiting their nationals from serving as mercenaries…” 67 Further, it 
rested the responsibility of enforcement at the feet of the States concerned to take the 
necessary measures to prohibit transit of mercenaries on their territory and to prohibit 
their nationals from serving as mercenaries.
In 1970 the General Assembly passed a resolution recognizing the legitimate right of
“liberation movements” to use “all the necessary means at their disposal”68  to achieve 
their objectives declaring that using mercenaries against national liberation movements 
was a criminal act.  In the same year, the General Assembly indirectly addressed the 
matter when it adopted the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations.69 In this declaration, the UN stated once again that “the practice of 
using mercenaries against national liberation movements in the colonial territories 
61 G.A.Res. 2395, U.N.GAOR, 23d Sess., 1730th mtg., at 8, U.N.Doc. A/7352 (1968).
62 G.A.Res. 2395, U.N.GAOR, 23d Sess., 1730th mtg., at 8, U.N.Doc. A/7352 (1968).
63 G.A.Res. 2465, U.N.GAOR, 23d Sess., 1751st mtg., U.N.Doc. A/L.560/Rev. 1, A/L.561/Add.1, 
A/L.563.
64 G.A.Res. 2465, U.N.GAOR, 23d Sess., 1751st mtg., U.N.Doc. A/L.560/Rev. 1, A/L.561/Add.1, 
A/L.563. Ibid. at para. 8.
65 G.A.Res. 2548, U.N.GAOR, 24th Sess., 1829th mtg., U.N.Doc. A/L.581/Add.1 (1969).
66 G.A.Res. 2548, U.N.GAOR, 24th Sess., 1829th mtg., U.N.Doc. A/L.581/Add.1 (1969) para 9.
67 G.A.Res. 2548, U.N.GAOR, 24th Sess., 1829th mtg., U.N.Doc. A/L.581/Add.1 (1969) para 9.
68
  Res. 2708 (XXVI) U.N.GAOR, 25th Sess., 1929th mtg, U.N. Doc., A/Res/2708 (XXV) (1970).
69 G.A.Res. 2625, U.N.GAOR, 25th Sess., 1883d mtg., U.N.Doc. A/8082 (1970).
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constitutes a criminal act.” In the same year, the Assembly directly addressed the matter 
in Resolution 2708 which was passed specifically to implement the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.70 The resolution largely 
echoed the sentiments in previous resolutions which criminalized mercenary activity 
and urged the passage of domestic legislation to this effect. Equally, Resolution 2727 of 
December 14, 1970, emphasized what had become a familiar chorus—using 
mercenaries against national liberation movements was a criminal act.71
In late 1973, the General Assembly returned yet again to the theme of regulating 
mercenary activities in post-colonial regimes with the passage of Resolution 3103.72
The resolution entitled the Declaration on Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the 
Combatants Struggling against Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes, met 
noted that:
The use of mercenaries by colonial and racist regimes against the national liberation 
movements struggling for their freedom and independence from the yoke of Colonialism and 
alien domination is considered to be a criminal act and the mercenaries should accordingly be 
punished as criminals.73
In 1979, the General Assembly took a decisive step in the outlawing and control of 
mercenaries. In Resolution 34/140 it decided to consider the drafting of an international 
convention to outlaw mercenarism in all its manifestations.74 “The Assembly at that 
time stipulated that “mercenarism is a threat to international peace and security and, like 
murder, piracy and genocide, is a universal crime.”75 “With this language, the Assembly 
went further than ever before in its condemnation of mercenaries.”76
In addition to commencing the drafting process of the International Convention, which 
got underway in the early 1980s, the United Nations continued to issue a series of 
resolutions addressing mercenarism.77 In these resolutions, the United Nations 
70
 GA Res. 2708, U.N.GAOR, 25th Sess., 1929th mtg, Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1970).
71 G.A.Res. 2727, U.N.GAOR, 25th Sess., 1921st mtg., U.N. Doc., A/Res/2727 (XXV) (1970).
72 G.A. Res. 3103, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
73 G.A. Res. 3103, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
74 It was this initiative which led to the adoption of a convention in 1989—International Convention 
Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, G.A. Res. A/44/34, U.N. GAOR, 
44th Sess., 72nd mtg. (1989) (Convention on Mercenaries).
75 It was this initiative which led to the adoption of a convention in 1989—International Convention 
against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, G.A. Res. A/44/34, U.N. GAOR, 
44th Sess., 72nd mtg. (1989) (Convention on Mercenaries).
76
 Marie-France Major, ‘Mercenaries and International Law’, 22 Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 103, 126 (1992).
77 See U.N.S.C. Res., U.N. SCOR, 2314th mtg., U.N. Doc.S/Res/496 (1981); G.A. Res. 51, U.N. GAOR, 
44th Sess., 78th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/51 (1989) (referring to the 1988 attempted invasion of 
Maldives); G.A. Res. 31, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 83rd mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/49/31 (1995) 
(emphasizing the vulnerability of small states to the external threat of mercenaries and “[c] ondemning all 
such acts of aggression”); G.A. Res. 33, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 44th mtg. P 17, U.N. Doc. A/Res/45/33 
(1990); G.A. Res. 79, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 78th mtg. P 34, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/79 (1989) 
(interposing the term “mercenaries” with “armed terrorists”); The General Assembly condemns the 
continued recruitment and use of mercenaries “for the purpose of destabilizing and overthrowing the 
Governments of African States and of other developing States and fighting against the national liberation 
movements of peoples struggling for the exercise of their right to self-determination.” G.A. Res. 89, U.N. 
GAOR, 46th Sess., 74th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/46/89 (1992).
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continued to emphasize that the activities of mercenaries are contrary to the 
fundamental principles of international law, such as “non-interference in the internal 
affairs of states” and “territorial integrity and independence.”78 The resolutions further 
explicitly condemn mercenarism, and like their predecessors emphasised the criminality 
of the activity, placing an obligation on individual States to enact the necessary 
domestic legislation. 
It may argued, that the multitude of General Assembly resolutions and their repeated 
appeals for governments to restrict the supply and demand for mercenaries is evidence 
that states have obligations under international law to both criminalize and punish 
mercenaries. However, in the often frustrating and politically-driven law making 
process in the international system, matters are not as clear-cut as this. A number of 
factors militate against the argument that the resolutions posit legal obligations. 
Firstly many of the General Assembly resolutions addressed particular conflicts. 
Secondly, the General Assembly resolutions are broader in scope than established 
customary international norms. Thirdly, “under the U.N. Charter, the General Assembly 
has no authority to enact, alter, or terminate rules of international law.”79 Lastly, 
“General Assembly resolutions do not necessarily constitute international law. Instead, 
resolutions from the General Assembly …may only represent the crystallization of 
customary international law or evidence of state practice and opinio juris.”80
Overall and especially in relation to contemporary PMFs, the narrow focus of General 
Assembly resolutions adopted in the process of outlawing mercenarism is significant. 
Despite mercenarism dominating the UN agenda as evidenced by a multitude of 
resolutions, the importance of the issue is singularly tied to the context of national self-
determination. The initiatives focus largely on the relationship between mercenary 
activities and the stifling of the right to self-determination. This necessarily means that 
contemporary PMFs operating internationally and outside the specific context of wars 
of national liberation fall outside the limits of General Assembly initiatives. The 
importance of a clearer legal definition of mercenaries and context of operations thus 
remains an open question. 
B. Specialized Mercenary Conventions
Regional Instruments
In 1971, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of 
African Unity Convention (OAU) declared that mercenaries represented a threat to the 
“independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the harmonious development of 
Member States of the OAU” and condemned the use of mercenaries as inimical to the 
sovereignty of member states.81 The following year, the process of drafting of the 
Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa commenced. This initiative 
resulted five years later in the signing of the Organization of African Unity Convention 
78 G.A. Res. 89, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 89th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/46/89 (1992).
79
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John H. Brant, Law of the Mercenary: An International Dilemma, 6 Cap. U. L. Rev. 339, app. at 365-66 
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for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa.82 The Convention directly codifies a ban 
on mercenaries.83 Article 1 of the convention states: 
[A] “mercenary” is classified as anyone who, not a national of the state against which his 
actions are directed, is employed, enrols or links himself willingly to a person, group or 
organization whose aim is:
(a) to overthrow by force of arms or by any other means the government of that Member State 
of the Organization of African Unity;
(b) to undermine the independence, territorial integrity or normal working of the institutions of 
the said State;
(c) to block by any means the activities of any liberation movement recognized by the 
Organization of African Unity.84
As the Special Rapporteur on mercenarism noted in 1988,85 this was the first instrument 
of international criminal law which was applicable in the territory of the States party to 
the Convention and to all persons covered by its provisions. It was also notable because 
it imposed well defined obligations on each of the parties and stressed the need to adopt
appropriate measures in each State’s domestic criminal law. The Convention was 
intended to control the use of mercenaries by insurgent groups and coup-makers. Under 
the Convention, mercenarism was confined to acts committed by States or individual 
actors who have the “aim of opposing by armed violence a process of self-
determination, stability or the territorial integrity of another State….” 86
The Convention had two significant drawbacks. Firstly, it did not prohibit States from 
hiring mercenaries. It defined mercenaries only as those men who sold their services to 
a “person, group or organization” engaged in insurgency against a State.87 It only 
prohibits governments from hiring mercenaries to suppress movements of national 
liberation, but does not proscribe the hiring of mercenaries by legitimate governments.88
The hypocrisy of this position despite the reality that mercenarism is a pernicious 
problem in Africa is answered in part by Montgomery Sapone’s observation that: “By 
permitting their own use of mercenaries, while controlling circulation among non-State 
actors, States established a pool of legitimate purchasers of military manpower.”89 This 
was based in part on the desperate weakness of many African States, whose security 
forces were and still are often either ineffectual or oppressive or both, and the appeal of 
the military companies, both to African politicians and to Western businesses and 
82 Organization of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa, O.A.U. Doc. 
CM/433/Rev. L., Annex 1 (1972) (OAU Convention).
83 See Paul Mourning, Leashing the Dogs of War: Outlawing the Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries, 22 
Va. J. Int’l L. 589, 600-01 (1982).
84 OAU Convention, above note 68.
85
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86 OAU Convention, above note 68, at art. 1, § 2.
87 Article I defined mercenaries as any non-nationals employed by a person, group or organization whose 
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governments.90 The net result is that highly professional, well-organized and well-
equipped soldiers of fortunes with the capacity to crush insurrections and get mineral 
exports going were seen as a useful tool of the State (allowing States to continue to 
monopolize the market for alienable military skills) but disapproved of in as far as non-
statal entities would seek to make use of them..91
The second significant drawback to the Convention is its status as a source of 
international law regarding mercenarism. Its regional character which localizes and 
particularizes the problem to post-colonial Africa soldiers of fortune serves in part in its 
being viewed as a regional convention addressing regional issues. This denies it playing 
a more significant role in creating added impetus in international circles towards 
criminalizing and punishing mercenarism.
International Instruments
In 1989, after seven long years of delicate negotiations and drafting, the International 
Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries was 
adopted by the UN. It was first convention of international scope against mercenarism.92
The Convention defines a mercenary in Article 1 as:
1. A mercenary is any person who: 
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; 
(b) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in 
fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially 
in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed 
forces of that party; 
(c) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party 
to the conflict; 
(d) Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and 
(e) Has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a 
member of its armed forces. 93
The Convention establishes an expansive definition of mercenary.94  Coming at the end 
of a long unbroken series of General Assembly resolutions stretching back into the 
1960s, it also appears to crystallize the customary international law regarding 
mercenaries.95 The Convention reflects an emphasis on the punishment of mercenaries 
themselves96 as well as those who promote or organize mercenary activities.97
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Significantly, States’ responsibilities go beyond merely recruiting, using, financing, or
training mercenaries to include duties to prevent offences under the Convention and 
notification of the UN or affected States parties to establish jurisdiction over the 
Convention’s offences. In addition, the Convention obligates states to apprehend 
suspects, to extradite suspects under certain circumstances and, in cases where the State 
does not extradite the suspect, to “submit the case to its proper authorities for the 
purpose of prosecution.”98  The Convention, if followed by States, will help guarantee 
the right of peoples to self-determination and ensure a certain stability to lawfully 
constituted governments. As the Special Rapporteur in his 1991 report noted: 
The formulation of broader, more comprehensive and more precise international regulations 
updated to take account of the forms which mercenarism has assumed in recent years with the 
aim of overthrowing Governments and undermining the constitutional order or territorial 
integrity of States highlights the importance of this new multilateral instrument and the 
necessity and desirability of its prompt entry into force.99
The anti-mercenary conventions (both regional and international) discussed above have 
three primary weaknesses. Firstly, despite their emphasis on punishment of mercenaries 
the criminal jurisdiction granted to States is very restrictive falling within the traditional 
nationality or territoriality link.100 It is the linkage between the mercenary and the State 
that is crucial to providing governments with the basis for jurisdiction. Unfortunately 
this linkage, even if it can be established, is impractical in so far as States themselves 
are complicit in the activities of mercenaries. In any case, the bulk of the activities of 
the PMFs is extra-territorial and thus effectively places the burden of prosecution on the 
local government which often has only rudimentary or seriously compromised 
administrative and criminal justice structures. The extra-territorial nature of PMF 
actions allows governments (usually Western) to fend off any criticisms in relation to 
accountability issues. 
Secondly, the primary definition under the UN Mercenary Convention would exclude 
State actors sent by their home state (a third party, neutral state) if they were “on official 
duty as a member of [the sending state’s] armed forces.”101 In this regard, Todd S 
Milliard a Judge Advocate with the US Army notes that: “In addition to covering 
service members, this exclusion would likely extend to military technical advisors who 
were government employees or government-sanctioned contractors of the sending state. 
The secondary definition would exclude state actors sent by their home state, provided 
they were on ‘official duty.’”102 Therefore, this exclusion would cover any sending State 
government employee or government-sanctioned contractor, whether or not considered 
a member of the sending State’s armed forces, in addition to the sending State’s actual 
97 The aims of the Convention are expressed in its preamble. Convention against Mercenaries above note 
75.
98 Convention against Mercenaries, above note 75, arts. 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15
99 See U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n.Hum.Rts., 47th Sess., Agenda Item 9, at 35, U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/1991/14 
(1990).
100 Article 9 of the Convention against Mercenaries, above note 75, which outlines the jurisdiction of 
States over the crime of mercenarism, stipulates that a State shall have jurisdiction when the offence is 
committed in its territory (or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State) and when the offence is 
committed by any of its nationals.
101 Convention against Mercenaries, art. 1(1) (e).
102
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service members. Thus, a PMF acting on sending State instructions or sometimes 
sanctioned by the sending State is legally acceptable.
Thirdly, the anti-mercenary conventions address the use of mercenaries almost 
exclusively in so far as it is a means of violating human rights and impeding the 
exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination by the post-colonial Africa breed 
of mercenary. The recent emergence and proliferation dozens of PMFs offering services 
focused on recognized governments than on rebels have displaced the “gangs of misfit 
professional soldiers” and as a result they manage to effectively fall through the cracks 
of the various anti-mercenary conventions even though they some mercenary traits.
C. The Law of Armed Conflict
Hague Conventions
The Hague Conventions of 1907 represent the first international effort aimed at 
regulating mercenary activities. The Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of 
Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land (Hague V)103 aspires to “lay down 
more clearly the rights and duties of neutral Powers [toward belligerents] in case of war 
on land,”104 thereby codifying customary international law to the satisfaction of the 
States’ plenipotentiaries attending the drafting conference.
Article 4 of Hague V provides: “Corps of combatants cannot be formed nor recruiting 
agencies opened on the territory of a neutral Power to assist the belligerents.”105 Article 
6 continues: “The responsibility of a neutral Power is not engaged by the fact of persons 
crossing the frontier separately to offer their services to one of the belligerents.”106
Article 4 is based on the doctrine of State responsibility under customary international 
law. This doctrine holds that a state is normally responsible for those illegalities which 
it has originated.107 However a state does not bear responsibility for acts injurious to 
another state committed by private individuals when the illegal deeds do not proceed 
from the command, authorization, or culpable negligence of the government.108 One 
may thus conclude that under Article 4, a neutral state must allow neither mercenary 
expeditions to be formed nor mercenary recruiting to take place on its territory. 109
Similarly one sees strong echoes of State responsibility in Article 6. When one 
considers that the concept provides that if the state neglects the duties imposed by 
vicarious responsibility it incurs original liability for the private acts and is guilty of an 
international delinquency. However no state bears absolute responsibility for 
international illegalities committed by individuals acting on its territory.110 In the same 
vein Article 6 limits the state’s regulatory obligation placing no duty on it “to prevent 
individuals—whether its citizens or another state’s citizens—from crossing its borders 
to serve as mercenaries for a belligerent.”111
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From the analysis above it is evident that the provisions of Hague Convention V have a 
fuzzy quality to them. Though a neutral State must prevent domestic mercenary 
recruitment or staging activities under Hague V, it is not required to outlaw the 
mercenary per se. In this way, “[t]he individual mercenary himself was only indirectly 
affected [through Hague V], by means of the implementation by a State of its 
obligations as a neutral.”112 The end result is that in spite of the fact that the Hague V 
recognizes mercenarism as a problem, it neither criminalizes the activity nor sets out 
any substantive obligations on the part of the States other than an exhortation not to 
assist or participate in the process of  assembling such outfits.
Additional Protocol I
The 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional 
Protocol I), provides the international community’s definitive statement on 
mercenaries.113 In Additional Protocol I, a mercenary is defined as any person who: 
(a) is specifically recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in 
fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially 
in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed 
forces of that Party;
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party 
to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member 
of its armed forces.114
Article 47 of Additional Protocol I removes the protection of combatant or prisoner of 
war status from mercenaries and provides a definition of a mercenary.115 Other than 
simply depriving mercenaries of the status as participants in armed conflict, and 
protections afforded to other combatants, the provision does not seek in any way to 
regulate the international military market, or restrict consumption to certain categories 
of consumers.116 Those who object to PMFs claim that they fall under Additional 
Protocol I’s Article 47 definition of mercenaries noting that:
The employees of SCs are foreign military soldiers specially recruited abroad and paid in 
excess of what the military personnel of the contracting State are paid; they engage in fighting; 
and they are not sent on official duty of the armed forces of another State.117
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From a substantive perspective, three significant hurdles arise under Article 47. To 
begin with, David Kassebaum observes that “[t]his definition of a mercenary is 
cumulative; all requirements must be met before a person can be labelled a mercenary. 
Unfortunately, from a law-enforcement viewpoint, the requirements lack specificity.”118
Secondly, paragraph 2 of Article 47 imposes criteria as to a mercenary’s motivation119
and relative compensation.120  As the Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors 
Appointed to Inquire into Mercenarism noted over three decades ago, these elements are 
extremely difficult to prove, thus limiting a State’s legal basis to deprive mercenaries of 
lawful combatant and prisoner of war status.121 The report went on to note that the 
international definition of “mercenary” based on the motivation of the combatant was 
not viable, as it is difficult to determine exact motivation in the legal realm. The report 
concluded that the flawed definitions meant that “to serve as a mercenary is not an 
offence under international law.”122 These observations have not changed throughout 
the years. As recently as 2002, in considering Article 47’s mercenary definition in its 
entirety, the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office concluded that “[a]
number of governments including the British Government regard this definition as 
unworkable for practical purposes.”123
Secondly, active combatant status is also required under Article 47. Section 2 requires 
that mercenaries take direct part in the hostilities124 and “excludes mere advisers by 
requiring that to be a mercenary, one must in fact take a direct part in hostilities, that is, 
become a combatant [sic], albeit an illegitimate one.”125 It is clear under the law of 
armed conflict that experts who do not take direct part in combat are regarded as 
civilians under international law.126 Thus at first glance, PMFs in general appear to fall 
outside the conjunctive definition of Article 47 since they tend to restrict their activities 
to training government troops only. But even this is questionable considered in the light 
of some of their operations. Advances in remote-operated weaponry capabilities make it 
difficult to identify which combatants are taking “direct” part in the hostilities.127 The 
most dramatic example of the slippery nature of classifying the combat status of PMF 
employees is offered by the experience in Colombia. Numerous PMFs are working 
under contracts with the Colombian government, the United States Department of 
Defence, and the United States Department of State. They make up roughly twenty 
percent of the American military personnel working in Columbia. Their operations 
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include flying Blackhawk attack helicopters and manning surveillance aircraft to assist 
Colombian security forces in the ongoing military campaign against drug cartels and 
Marxist guerrilla rebels. These actions—which are essential to the military operations—
can only be classed as of a combat nature.128
Thirdly, Article 47 (1) (f) of Additional Protocol I also identifies a mercenary as a 
person who has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official 
duty as a member of its armed forces.129 In view of the complicity of States in the use of 
PMFs, it can be argued that a PMF, which receives authorization from its home State to 
operate abroad (through a licensing process or more informally), is “sent by a State 
which is not a party to the conflict on official duty” and that the PMF represents a 
member of that State’s armed forces.130 The contractual nature of the services provided 
also provide ample basis for characterizing employees of PMFs as civilian contractors, 
although not regarded as a member of the military force in the field, they are 
assimilated.131 This implies that PMFs can be regarded as contractors of their home 
States or of their employing States. In either case, PMFs would be tied to State actors 
and would fall outside the definition of a mercenary in this aspect as well.
In sum, Additional Protocol I does not prohibit the use of mercenaries by States or other 
entities. Part of the weaknesses of the Protocol is owing to the fact that it singled out  a 
particular kind of mercenary, the soldier of fortune who emerged in the 1960s to wreck 
havoc in Africa. The provisions were specifically tailored to address this problem. They 
were branded as criminals, regardless of who employed them or on whose behalf they 
fought.  As Montgomery Sapone notes:
The Protocol I definition is so restrictive that almost no one will fall into the category. One 
military historian remarked that, “any mercenary who cannot exclude himself from this 
definition deserves to be shot—and his lawyer with him!”132
Even beyond the provisions dealing with mercenarism under the law of armed conflict, 
it is clear that PMFs are not mercenaries, particularly because State accountability is the 
key to distinguishing mercenaries from other combatants. PMFs are tied to States in 
various unofficial ways. 
1. PMFs are legal entities, bound to employing States by recognized contracts and to 
home States by laws requiring registration, periodic reporting, and licensing of foreign 
contracts in most cases. 
2. most PMFs are willing to share information with their home governments because the 
home governments tend to be large, repeat customers that appreciate voluntary 
cooperation.
3. PMFs try to act in their home States’ interest abroad, thereby making the PMFs quasi-
State agents. 
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4. PMFs are long-term market players (unlike most individual mercenaries)133
The reality is that existing international law neither regulates nor forbids the activities of 
mercenaries, but rather proposes a definition and specifies their legal status only under 
certain conditions. As Enrique Ballesteros, the UN-appointed expert on the subject, 
acknowledged several years ago, defining mercenaries is extremely difficult, if not 
outright impossible, and certainly of no assistance in dealing with the PMF industry.134
IV. CONCLUSION
There are two fundamental problems with attempting to regulate PMFs domestically 
each of which presently undermines any effective national regulation of PMFs. The first 
issue derives from the organizational form of military firms. Being service-orientated 
businesses that operate on the global level with small infrastructures, PMFs have the 
ability to transform in order to circumvent legislation or escape prosecution. They may 
do this through a variety of devices including taking on a new corporate structure or 
name whenever they are legally challenged. The second problem with national 
regulation results from the often extraterritorial nature of their activities and hence 
possible enforcement. This is manifest in Professor Avant’s observation that:
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the U.S.-led entity charged with governing Iraq 
through June 2004, stipulated that contractors [were] subject to the laws of their parent country, 
not Iraqi law. Even U.S. legislation created to address this issue (the Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act of 2000) lacks specifics and entrusts the U.S. secretary of defence with 
initiating prosecutions. Countries that opposed the war may have a particularly hard time 
prosecuting contractors for crimes committed in Iraq. That is especially true of countries such 
as South Africa that claim contractors from their country are exporting services without the 
government's permission. 135
Fundamentally, the real risk of gross misbehaviour by PMFs is not their operations in 
their home States—predominantly Western countries—but rather in the execution of 
contracts they have in weak or failing States. Local authorities in such areas often have 
neither the power nor the wherewithal to challenge these firms. As Singer notes: “The 
vast majority of domestic laws and ordinances across the globe either ignore the 
phenomenon of private military actors…or fall well short of any ability to define or 
regulate the industry.”136
The failure of domestic law to establish the exact legal status of privatized military
firms effectively defers the problems to the international level. But in this arena, once 
again the weaknesses of domestic legal regimes are mirrored. As noted in Part III of the 
article above, the ambiguous status of PMFs under international law means that the anti-
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mercenary convention regime neither defines nor regulates them.137 In the words of 
Singer:
… the privatized military industry lies outside the full domain of all of these existing 
[international] legal regimes. The various loose formulations of exactly who is a mercenary, as 
well as the absence of any real mechanism for curtailing mercenary activities, creates 
difficulties for anyone attempting to curtail PMF activity by use of international law.138
Singer’s observation finds support in Professor Avant’s view that:
The status of contractors is … contentious under international law. Most security company 
activity falls outside the purview of the 1989 U.N. Convention on Mercenaries, which governs 
only such egregious soldier-of-fortune activities as overthrowing a government. Human rights 
law generally binds only states, reducing the formal legal responsibilities of contractors. 139
In sum, PMFs, as presently constituted, do not fall within the definition of mercenaries 
and their activities are not prohibited by recognized international norms. The 
prohibitions against mercenaries are not devised to deal with security corporations 
employed by recognized regimes. These restrictions are also not meant to supersede a 
sovereign State’s right to employ foreign personnel to restore order or to provide 
security within their country. This reality compounded by numerous countries that 
utilize the services of PMFs has led the charge against the use of mercenaries. As 
Louise Doswald-Beck writes: 
Multinational or other industries who use such companies ought to be accountable in some way 
for their behaviour; yet these clients are neither states nor parties to an internal armed conflict 
in any traditional sense of the word. The security companies concerned are in principle bound 
by the law of the state in which they function; in reality this will not have much effect if they 
actually engage in hostilities.140
With proper international enforcement norms lacking and weak ineffective domestic 
sanction, private security companies pose a threat to global security. This is primarily 
because they are not governed by adequate accountability regimes and thus face no 
clear of effective legal liability, sanction and punishment for human rights breaches. 
The authors argue that international regulation is necessary. Regulation would benefit 
legitimate companies by providing them with greater legitimacy while separating them 
from those truly “mercenary” groups willing to fight for any organization capable of 
paying them. This position finds support in David Shearer’s argument that the focus 
should be on the normative framework in which the actors operate.141 “He suggests that 
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instead of turning away from military companies we should engage them.”142 Summing 
up Shearer’s postulations Professor Avant notes that:
This strategy is likely to be successful if the new military companies see themselves as 
legitimate purveyors of expertise rather than mercenaries. Thus an international system of 
engagement with these firms would not only create processes of accountability, but would also 
build on and reinforce an identity that would bias these firms toward abiding by international 
rules.143
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